میموگیٹ اسکینڈل: حسین حقانی اور منصور اعجاز کے درمیان مکالمہ

05/10/2011 12:45 MI: I was just informed by senior US intel that GD-SII Mr P asked for, and received permission, from senior Arab leaders a few days ago to sack Z. For what its worth
MI: By the way, I know a lot more than you give me credit for about the circumstances that led to May 1 and your role in all that. Just FYI
HH: Honorable ppl stick with one another. Take care.

05/09/2011 12:31 HH: Are you in London? I am here just for 36 hours. Can we meet for after dinner coffee or s thing?
05/09/2011 12:32 MI: I m in Monaco but it s no problem for me to fly up. Takes 90 minutes. What time did you have in mind? Where do you want to meet?
05/09/2011 12:35 HH: Pls call me. I m at the Park Lane Intercon +442071060900 room 430
05/09/2011 12:35 HH: Waiting for ur call now 05/09/2011 13:37 MI: Could access to the 3 stooges who widow the man be arranged as part of the bigger picture?
05/09/2011 13:39 HH: I am sure that can be arranged upon formal demand
05/09/2011 13:40 MI: That is critical to breaking apart the system outside – and understanding what was going on inside. Would we get candor and truth or some brainwashed jargon?
05/09/2011 13:40 MI: The calls to Isphani s people have been made. Very very receptive reaction so far
05/09/2011 13:44 HH: If my friend and I feel sufficiently empowered in relation to the bad boys, I will ensure we get candor
05/09/2011 13:45 MI: Got it. Let me see if we can t get you a sledge hammer with a golden handle
05/09/2011 13:47 HH: Would be nice
05/09/2011 13:47 MI: I m sending you a PIN message that others cannot see. Please respond. Thanks
05/09/2011 13:48 HH: Okay. Thx
05/09/2011 13:54 MI: Message by PIN sent
05/09/2011 13:56 HH: Okay
05/09/2011 14:22 MI: Message has been delivered to Isphani. Receptiom positive but I need you to agree to do something. Can I call you?
05/09/2011 15:02 MI: Please PING when you can talk and on what number. Time sensitive
05/09/2011 15:05 HH: Entering No 10. Can speak on cell after an hour
05/09/2011 15:05 MI: Okay. I ll wait for your PING
05/09/2011 16:09 HH: PING!!!
05/09/2011 16:09 HH: PING!!!
05/09/2011 16:09 HH: Pls call on cell now +16179532835
05/09/2011 16:10 HH: PING!!!
05/09/2011 16:19 MI: Sorry. Was stuck on call to DC. Pls ping again when ready
05/09/2011 18:26 HH: PING!!!
05/09/2011 18:27 MI: Tried you. Phone says unavailable
05/09/2011 18:38 MI: The message I sent is what MM will see. It will be given directly to him and no one else
05/09/2011 18:59 MI: My friend in DC simply said too many people have been burned in the past two years on the US side and he wanted to insure that on such a sensitive subject, the data and proposal are clear. This is you to me, me to him. He trusts me enough to know I won t bring it forward unless it has top level approval. He does not need it with any email addresses etc. He will scrub that in any event. If you want names to be mentioned, yours, JK, MD, etc, I will do that in person. So get whatever message you want delivered back to me and I ll insure it gets in MM s hands. Best. M
05/09/2011 19:02 MI: By the way, the interesting thing is that they consider AZ s approval of the message worth more than anyone else in country right now. How do you like that?
05/09/2011 20:43 MI: I have additional information you need to hear. Ping when I can call you please
05/09/2011 21:10 MI: Would it be safe to say that you don t want to run this up your flagpole because you need to work this deal from the middle out? Tell me if that s the case and I ll use a different approach that does not require something in writing. What would then be helpful is if I could simply have a BBM saying my talking points are correct, or not, and then you set your table, I ll set my table and make sure you are an honored guest at my table when the party begins. If you re good with that, I just need your okay on the talking points. No need to run it up the az-pole, if you get my drift. M
05/10/2011 00:29 HH: Msg recvd. Tweaking. Middile of road option sounds good. Will call morning.
05/10/2011 00:29 HH: PING!!!
05/10/2011 00:37 MI: Will you be sending me your tweaks or am I to use my copy as final? If tweaks are short, I can call you to get them
05/10/2011 08:47 MI: You have mail from two of my mailboxes. Please read, respond and then we have one last short discussion before I put everything in motion. Thanks. M
05/10/2011 12:45 MI: I was just informed by senior US intel that GD-SII Mr P asked for, and received permission, from senior Arab leaders a few days ago to sack Z. For what its worth
05/10/2011 13:08 HH: Thanks. Very useful 05/10/2011 13:09 HH: My friend and I agree with middle option. Go ahead
05/10/2011 14:57 MI: Message delivered with caveat that he has to decide how hard to push – we only set the table. He must decide if he wants one course meal or seven course meal. Ball is in play now – make sure you have protected your flanks
05/11/2011 12:33 MI: I ve been asked to find out what time your meeting is today. Response so far indicates they are having a hard look, although they find it nearly impossible to believe anyone could deliver such results… to be expected, I suppose. Hope you got home okay. Did you see Mush while in London?
05/11/2011 14:59 MI: PING!!!
05/12/2011 00:36 HH: Call me on my cell
05/12/2011 00:37 HH: Also, M in ur msgs above referred to the Admiral, right?
05/12/2011 00:37 MI: Yes
05/12/2011 00:54 MI: Clarification. M at the end of a message is Mansoor. M or MM in the text of a message is the admiral. Apologies for any confusion. BBM when free. I ll call you. Whether it is shattering news or not is up to you to decide
05/12/2011 01:47 MI: I just received an email from my link to MM independently confirming what you told me by phone. He says MM was appreciative of our intervention and utilized the data to advise and consent
05/12/2011 02:47 HH: Thanx. On way to Isloo. Will touch base on return
05/12/2011 02:54 MI: Good luck. Let me know at any time if you need any help
Details of chat between MI and HH after his Financial article was published until the first week of November, 2011:
HH: you can keep saying you delivered a message and show bbm convos to prove it
HH: Basically you don t get it
HH: You have given hardliners in Pak Mil reason to argue there was an effort to get US to conspire against Pak Mil
HH: You are a US citizen
HH: You are supposed to look after US interests
MI: I wrote one article. Have not said one word on the record since then to anyone. I think your press is working both sides against the middle, trying to force something out of anyone they can. Period. I don t play in that game
HH: In Pak political situation, getting burned as a US stooge undermines one s effectiveness
HH: I will make sure FO shuts up
HH: Let this die down
HH: We are in the right
HH: We will still make things happen
MI: Okay, well I know my IQ is pretty low so you are probably correct in saying I just don t get it.
HH: The Pak press be damned
HH: I stand by you as a man of integrity werving his country
HH: You don t let ppl back home argue I play for your team, not ours
MI: But from my point of view, if there was a real threat, as you stated at the time, it is clear you were trying to save a democratic structure from those hawks
HH: You get to write the book on how you changed US-Pak dynamic and won the war in A tan (w/ some help from a Paki nerd) 😀
MI: I was happy to get the message in the back door because it served American interests to preserve the democratic civilian setup and the offers made, if achieved, were very much congruent with American objectives in the region
HH: True that, friend. But you know premature revelation ain t good
MI: As far as I can see, we did right. Unless there is something I don t see here. But then I m sorta dumb from down on the farm where them hillbillies live
HH: Hey! Don t run down hillbillies
HH: Even the smartest can miss a piece of the puzzle
HH: You are assuming there are no powerful men in Pak willing to break w/ US. Premature revelation gives those ppl reason to claim conspiracy , treason
HH: That is all you missed. Period.
HH: And no one else might tell you this, you re becoming irritable and losing your sense of humor as you grow old
HH: Let this one go. There is much to do. MUCH. And then, there s the beach where I ve been waiting to be invited, the slum boy visiting the millionaire
MI: I m not a millionaire. But I do know a nice piece of beach!
HH: I m not a slum boy either but I know how to make friends with smart people with a sense of history 😛
MI: Jesus, then what the — are you doing hanging around with me? =D
HH: We ll make things happen and if we can t, we ll write a book about it
HH: Who said I was hanging around with you. A minute ago I thought you were about to hang me 😀
MI: :O MI: Really?
HH: Look, Isloo is a mess. Journos gone wild. Politicos scared of mil. Mil scared of Yanks.
MI: Tell me one important thing. Who likes you and who hates you in the US establishment? Who wants you to stay and who wants to — you up?
HH: The debate abt your oped has caused my detractors to put pressure on my boss
HH: In US estab, I can count on Leon and Petraeus
MI: I thought YOU were the boss!
MI: Who is against you?
HH: Folks at State don t like me
MI: Why?
MI: Too close to AZ?
HH: They think I am too mixed up w/ DoD and others and do not help them cut deals w/ Pak mil
HH: Close to AZ bit too
HH: They are wrong re DoD and others.
HH: It is just that becoz of A tan, they are more imp than State
MI: I always thought HRC was one of your fans. She even has a lady from our parts working with her
HH: It is folks at State who got pissed off by your mission
HH: She may be but I was Holbrooke s buddy so everyone who hates him hates me
HH: I have no time for just pushing paper around
HH: State likes process
MI: Which mission? Sudan, Kashmir, there were so many they got pissed off about. I showed them how to do real American diplomacy and that was like a big pile of shit on their desk they couldn t swallow
HH: Conferences, statements-with nothing changing
HH: The latest one
MI: Yeah, I got it. You re right!
MI: Anyway, State will always hate me because I don t accept their muddling way of doing things
HH: I don t know for a fact but I won t be surprised if the FO statement was prompted by someone here
HH: Robin Raphel is back as Grossman s deputy
HH: You stepped on her toes w/ Kashmir mission
MI: That would be typical. But Grossman knows me and he knows how serious I am. Raphael still hates me for the Kashmir intervention where she did everything she could to fuck me up
HH: And now they hate me more when folks back home who hate me tell them you and I might have been together on s thing (whether we were or not is irrelevant to them)
HH: Grossman is good but he doesn t like anyone playing a larger than life role. Old school
HH: That s why I have been requesting you to let this one go
MI: Yeah I know. Found that out when he was our lobbyist. But he s a good guy
HH: That takes attention off me
MI: Hmmmmmmmmm……. Not sure anything could take attention off you
HH: I try and make peace with State and focus on battles at home
HH: HaHa 😀 MI: Diplomacy at its finest!!! HH: Yeah, right! But at least I shd not be painted as playing for your team
MI: Why not? You were a good quarterback for those three days!!
HH: I want to solve -***ing problems not fight a rearguard action all the time
HH: 😡
HH: Let us wait and see if Hillary s latest foray changes things in any direction
MI: Did we really solve a true problem or was this all smoke and mirrors?
MI: I mean on those days of stress…
HH: View here is that everyone in Isloo sucks!
MI: That s pretty much true!!!!
HH: Too early to say re solution
MI: But if they all suck, then what did we save – a sinking ship that was going to sink anyway???
HH: And there is a genetic problem at that end, predisposed to going round and round in circles
MI: Yup!! That s for damn sure
HH: I think we save the situation from an extremely violent outcome
MI: How can you solve the problems you understand so well from here if all the people in charge over there are wrong? It s only one year til we have a change in the US. Then you really won t like who we have here!
HH: I mean, Iran might have done better if the Shah had been saved AND some true reform introduced
HH: Actually, I think the new ppl here might be better to deal with
HH: They won t take lies easily
MI: Don t bet on it. We have a lot of extremists cropping up and seeping into the system
MI: They don t trust anything Pakistani
MI: Don t matter what it is
HH: Well, in that case find me a cheap piece of beach 🙂
MI: Cain, Romney (who hates Muslims), Perry – its all the same crap
MI: Hmmmmm, yes, I can arrange that
MI: Why is Z such an idiot?
HH: But don t go off writing opeds abt arranging piece of beach w out consulting first 😛
HH: HaHa! Tough question
HH: I have a speech in 20 mins so let s keep that for later
HH: Bye for now
MI: Okay. Good luck.
HH: Thank you!
MI: Hi buddy, I understand you/ your foreign office hacks are commissioning hatchet pieces against me. Unfortunate…. very unfortunate
HH: I will enquire and stop them. There s no need for any of this.
HH: You haven t helped by engaging so much w/ Pak media.
HH: What happened to the silent soldier ?
MI: I issued a statement that was designed to put an end to all of this after Imran Khan s rally nonsense. But be that as it may, I m not going to tolerate character assassination in any of this
HH: I agree
HH: Will do my best to prevent it
MI: Roger that
HH: Focus on your policy message instead of who did what and we can turn this around
MI: Please remind your boss that his beloved wife, who later became a good friend of mine, tried the same bullshit tactics in 1996 when Maleeha was envoy – result: her government was dismissed in Nov 1996.
MI: I m not someone he can mess around with. He better get that message from me and really understand it
HH: My response to Imran was very simple and true: I did not write a treasonous letter and if Imran has a copy, he should present it
HH: I don t think your threatening helps
MI: That s true from my point of view as well. But politicians are politicians
MI: I don t make threats. I state facts. Your boss needs reminding of the facts
HH: Are you sure your side won t deny?
MI: No, maybe they will. But that would also be a mistake. Too much proof on that side as well.
HH: But does “proving” help anything?
HH: Is it not the nature of a private mission that officials deny it?
MI: Don t know. Don t care. My point is simple – I ve said what I was going to. Attacks on my person will not be tolerated. And my statement stands. Stop telling lies about me and I might just stip telling the truth about you
HH: If you were to listen to my advice, you would let this blow over and prove yourself afterwards. You are the one who will outlast the flying shit 🙂
HH: That is usually my strategy: be there when the others have self-destructed or blown over
MI: I ve kept to my word – if everyone wants to call it a fabrication and make me the fall guy, then gloves come off and it s not going to be fun or pretty for anyone
MI: You did something you thought was right outside channels because you felt it would be the most effective way to get the job done. I helped you execute. I haven t thrown you under the bus. But be damn sure I won t let anyone do that to me
HH: I ll do what I can to keep it pretty
HH: I haven t. I won t.
MI: By the way, I know a lot more than you give me credit for about the circumstances that led to May 1 and your role in all that. Just FYI
HH: Honorable ppl stick with one another. Take care.
MI: 😉
HH: I am maintaining silence so pls check with me before reacting if some Pak journo attributes anything to me
MI: It s interesting (and heartening) to see that many of the proposals made in the memo are now being implemented in the bilateral relationship. Very good

For all the fevered discussion about Memogate, one of the most arresting claims to emerge seems to have evaded even the faintest scrutiny. In the very evidence Mansoor Ijaz marshaled before the Pakistani public, he says there was a second, rival plot, set in train during the very same days in early May. It, too, involves a senior Pakistani official reaching out to foreign allies in a similarly abortive bid to take on a powerful institution back home.

About a quarter of the way down the purported BBM exchange between Ijaz and Husain Haqqani, the American businessman proffers an eyebrow-elevating tip. Some hours after the memo was delivered, Ijaz tells his alleged co-conspirator that he has learned of a clandestine effort to evict Asif Ali Zardari from Islamabad’s presidential palace.

“I was just informed by senior US intel,” Ijaz writes in a message on May 10, “that GD-SII Mr P asked for, and received permission, from senior Arab leaders a few days ago to sack Z. For what its worth.” It’s worth a great deal, if only because it carries the same weight as what else appears in the apparently incriminating exchange. In his hasty typing, where he manages to turn “DG-ISI” into an anagram, Ijaz was saying that top American spooks have told him that Lieut. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha secured a green light from Gulf potentates to overthrow the government.

Intrigued, I asked Ijaz to furnish some context. When the memo was being crafted, he told me in a telephone interview some days ago, he wanted to independently verify whether the Zardari government was truly imperiled. “One of the things I had done,” he explained over his London cell phone, “was to make sure that a senior person that I know in US intelligence would have had the opportunity to review what was about to sent over.” This, he added, was why Leon Panetta came to know of the memo, hinting at a CIA link.

Ijaz said he felt the measure was necessary “to make sure that there was nothing we were doing that was against US interests.” The well-placed source got back to him about a day later. “And the person told me,” Ijaz said, “that their information was that Pasha had traveled to a few of the Arab countries to talk about what would be necessary to do in the event they had to remove Zardari from power and so forth.”

Did he find the information credible? “Of course I thought it was credible,” Ijaz replied, slightly exasperated by the question. “I wouldn’t have repeated it if I didn’t. When I say, ‘a senior intel source,’ I mean senior,” he said, laying stress on the last word. Based on what his source told him, Ijaz said he had “confirmation that there was a real threat there at some point.”

The question of whether the shadow of a coup ever fell on the early days of May lies at the very root of Memogate and remains unresolved. Ijaz has claimed that coup jitters spurred Haqqani into action. Indeed, all claims in this regard emanate from Ijaz. They appeared in his column on the pink pages of the FT and in the memo that he dispatched. Haqqani, by contrast, denies there was ever talk of a fourth phase of Pakistani military rule. The army and the ISI, at least on this occasion, won’t disagree with the former ambassador.

And judging by the government’s reaction at the time, the need never arose. Before the memo even reached Admiral Mullen’s inbox, Yousaf Raza Gilani had already bellowed his support of Pakistan’s military-led spies. “Indeed, the ISI is a national asset and has the full support of the government,” the prime minister told parliament on May 10. “We are proud of its considerable achievements…” Gilani also failed to call for the “independent inquiry” floated in the memo, handing the responsibility instead to the army’s adjutant general. And a day later, the prime minister told me that the government, the army and the ISI were “all on the same page.”

So, the only one claiming that Gen Pasha was busily touring Arab capitals enlisting support for a coup is his London host. Like other allegations made in the Memogate affair, it rests on Ijaz’s credibility. If he is telling the truth, and his entire account is to be accepted, then both Haqqani and Gen Pasha were involved in shadowy schemes that merit further inquiry. And in each case, questions will inevitably arise about how much their respective bosses knew.

We already know that Ijaz has at least been right about Haqqani’s travel itinerary. The former envoy concedes that he was in London on the dates his accuser mentions. Gen Pasha’s movements are more opaque. According to news reports of May 7 – two days before Ijaz alleges Haqqani contacted him – the spy chief slipped out of Pakistan that day for “a sudden foreign visit”. The Nation newspaper, among others, reported that its sources said the “ISI chief’s visit could be to China, Saudi Arabia and UAE where he is expected to meet senior defence and military officials of these countries to brief Pakistan’s stance.”

Even if Gen Pasha did travel to these countries, two of which clearly qualify as homes to “Arab rulers,” perhaps nothing unseemly took place. Perhaps all that was discussed, quite appropriately, was Pakistan’s reaction to the bin Laden raid. But if Ijaz is wrong about the nature of Gen Pasha’s trip, then his other claims begin to crumble. It becomes very difficult to sustain the argument that he was telling the truth about Haqqani but lying about Gen Pasha.